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OK! for some: Douglas v Hello! 
in the House of Lords
A. INTRODUCTION
Six and a half years after the wedding of Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta Jones, 
the legal dispute surrounding the publication of unauthorised photographs of their 
wedding by Hello! magazine has been resolved by the House of Lords in favour of 
the publisher of the authorised wedding pictures, OK! magazine.1 The 3-2 division2 
in the House suggests, however, that the law in this area will provide plenty of scope 
for future debate.
The facts in brief were these.3 Prior to their wedding in November 2000, Mr Douglas 
and Miss Zeta Jones entered into a contract with OK! magazine granting OK! the exclu-
sive right to publish approved photographs of the wedding, for a fee of £1 million. 
Hello! magazine was unsuccessful in its competing bid for these rights. The Douglases 
undertook to take stringent security precautions to prevent any other photography at 
the wedding – an obligation which in the event they fulfi lled. Despite these measures, 
however, the wedding was infi ltrated by a paparazzo, Mr Thorpe, who, within 24 hours 
of the wedding, sold six out-of-focus4 photographs to Hello! for £125,000. The attempt 
by the Douglases and OK! to prevent publication of these unauthorised images failed 
when the Court of Appeal overturned an interim injunction on 23 November 2000,5 
with the result that both OK! and Hello! rushed to print. Editions of both magazines 
containing photographs of the wedding hit the newsstands on 24 November 2000.  
Following Hello!’s publication of the unauthorised photographs, the Douglases and 
OK! raised an action against Hello! for damages. Both claimants were successful at fi rst 
instance6 but in the Court of Appeal the decision in favour of OK! was overturned.7 
Thus, the position of the parties after the Court of Appeal’s decision was that Hello! 
was liable to the Douglases for breach of their privacy, with damages assessed at 
£14,600, while OK!’s claim on breach of confi dence was refused. OK! appealed to the 
House of Lords.
Two points concerning this appeal by OK! should be noted. First, the Douglases’ 
only connection at this stage is as the fi rst-named party in the case report:  they were 
not involved in the litigation in the House of Lords. Secondly, as a result of this, the 
1 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2007] UKHL 21, [2007] 2 WLR 920.
2 Lord Hoffmann, Baroness Hale of Richmond and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood found for OK! 
while Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe found for Hello!
3 More detailed accounts of the facts and, in particular, the contractual terms between the Douglases and 
OK! can be found in the judgments of the High Court, [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), [2003] 3 All ER 996, 
and the Court of Appeal, [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125.
4 The unauthorised photographs are generally described as unfocused and inferior, although Lord Walker 
does comment (at para 278) that their informality has “a certain appeal”.
5 Douglas v Hello! [2000] EWCA Civ 353, [2001] QB 967. 
6 Douglas v Hello! [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), [2003] 3 All ER 996 (on liability); [2003] EWHC 2629 (Ch) 
(on quantum).
7 Douglas v Hello! [2005] EWCA 595, [2006] QB 125.
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House of Lords was not required to consider privacy at all: in Lord Hoffmann’s words, 
“Whatever may have been the position of the Douglases, who, as I mentioned, recov-
ered damages for an invasion of their privacy, OK!’s claim is to protect commercial 
confi dential information and nothing more.”8  
OK!’s appeal regarding the photographs was based on two separate claims, namely 
“interference by unlawful means with its contractual or business relations or a breach 
of its equitable right to confi dentiality in photographic images of the wedding.”9 
A further complicating factor derives from this fi rst ground, the economic tort of 
causing loss by unlawful means: the appeal was heard and the judgment was given as a 
conjoined opinion with two other cases both involving the economic torts.10  However, 
as OK! succeeded on its breach of confi dence submissions rather than the economic 
tort claim, the economic tort element of the appeal will be left out of this analysis. A 
fi nal comment at the outset is to emphasise that this is, of course, a decision concerning 
English rather than Scots law, and its impact beyond England remains to be seen.
B. BREACH OF CONFIDENCE AND OK!’S RIGHTS
In order to determine whether OK! had an enforceable right, based on breach of 
confi dence, the House of Lords had to consider the prior question of whether the 
wedding photographs amounted to confi dential information. If the photographs were 
confi dential and if OK! benefi ted from that confi dence, the fi nal issue was whether 
Hello! had infringed that confi dence by publishing the unauthorised images or whether 
OK! had already placed the information in the public domain, thereby destroying its 
confi dentiality.11  
Lord Hoffmann, for the majority, concluded that the wedding photographs did 
constitute confi dential information. In arriving at this decision, Lord Hoffmann did 
not consider the nature of the information as critical as might be thought. Instead:12
The fact that the information happens to have been about the personal life of the Douglases 
is irrelevant. It could have been about anything that a newspaper was willing to pay for. What 
matters is that the Douglases, by the way they arranged their wedding, were in a position to 
impose an obligation of confi dence. They were in control of the information.  
Given that the photographs qualifi ed as confi dential information, the nature of OK!’s 
right also required to be determined. A signifi cant factor appears to have been the 
high value of the information to both contracting parties:13  
8 [2007] UKHL 21, [2007] 2 WLR 920 at para 118, per Lord Hoffmann. For a recent discussion of privacy 
see E Reid, “Wainwright v United Kingdom: bringing human rights home?” (2007) 11 EdinLR 83, and 
for comments on a number of article 8 privacy cases see H L MacQueen “Protecting privacy” (2004) 8 
EdinLR 248, 420.
9 [2007] UKHL 21 at para 2 per Lord Hoffmann.
10 The full case name of the House of Lords’ opinion in this case is actually: OBG Limited and others v 
Allan and others; Douglas and another and others v Hello! Limited and others; Mainstream Properties 
Limited v Young and others and another.
11 Although the facts were novel, the principles to be applied were those previously established in the lead-
ing breach of confi dence cases in England: Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41; Attorney 
General v Guardian Newspapers Limited (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109.
12 [2007] UKHL 21 at para 118.
13 Para 117 per Lord Hoffmann (his emphasis).
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The point of which one should never lose sight is that OK! had paid £1m for the benefi t of 
the obligation of confi dence imposed upon all those present at the wedding in respect of 
any photographs of the wedding. That was quite clear. Unless there is some conceptual or 
policy reason why they should not have the benefi t of that obligation, I cannot see why they 
were not entitled to enforce it. And in my opinion there are no such reasons. Provided that 
one keeps one’s eye fi rmly on the money and why it was paid, the case is, as Lindsay J held, 
quite straightforward.
In the absence of any conceptual or policy reasons against protection, therefore, OK!’s 
interest in the confi dentiality of the wedding photographs was one that the law would 
enforce.
From a commercial standpoint, this is a sensible result. It refl ects what happens 
in commercial practice, when magazines and newspapers are prepared to pay large 
sums of money to secure exclusive rights to publish information regarding people in 
the news,14 and it ensures that the commercial value of these exclusive deals, for the 
celebrities and the media, is protected. Lord Hoffmann’s stance on the fi nancial value 
of the deal was supported by Lord Brown: “Having paid £1m for an exclusive right it 
seems to me that OK! ought to be in a position to protect that right and to look to the 
law for redress were a third party intentionally to destroy it.”15
Yet relying on the commercial value of a deal to determine its status as a legally 
protected right is potentially troublesome, and creates considerable legal uncertainty. 
If the Douglases had not charged a fee at all, or if they had charged a lesser sum, or if 
they had donated their fee (of whatever amount) to charity, then the commercial value 
of the deal might be negligible, yet the facts and subject matter would remain the 
same. Would the law still protect the exclusive right if not supported by a substantial 
fee? Disagreeing with Lord Hoffmann’s “appeal to economic realities” Lord Walker 
noted that “the confi dentiality of any information must depend on its nature, not on 
its market value.”16
If market value is not a helpful yardstick for whether specifi c information benefi ts 
from an obligation of confi dence, what guidance can be derived from the nature of 
that information? There is general consensus that anything trivial or useless would 
be excluded from protection, as would anything that it was in the public interest to 
disclose.17 Other than this, the individual opinions tend to produce a rather confused 
and unhelpful picture. Lord Walker disagreed with the notion that either market value 
or the control exercised by the Douglases could create confi dentiality and noted that 
the unauthorised images were not embarrassing or offensive. He therefore concluded 
that the wedding photographs were not protected by the doctrine of confi dence.18 
14 Celebrity weddings, although a popular subject for the media, are not the only ones. A good example of 
non-celebrities with a story to tell is the case of the Royal Marines held captive in Iran for two weeks in 
March and April 2007, and who then sold their stories to the press on their release.
15 Para 325. Both Lord Hoffmann and Lord Brown were infl uenced by the commercial elements of the 
deal. This is by no means unusual in developing areas. Another “celebrity case” which sought to refl ect 
the “realities of the market place” was the false endorsement case of Irvine v Talksport: see Laddie J’s 
decision at [2002] 1 WLR 2355 at paras 38-39, 43. Note however that the legal bases on which Irvine 
was decided were entirely different from those in Douglas v Hello!.
16 Para 299.
17 Paras 120 (Lord Hoffmann), 272 (Lord Walker) and 307 (Baroness Hale).
18 Para 294.
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Can it be inferred from his analysis that embarrassing or offensive images would be 
protected? This would be so in the case of privacy,19 but whether it also operates for 
confi dentiality remains unexplored. Baroness Hale, on the other hand, agreed with 
Lord Hoffmann’s analysis and noted that “we have not been given any principled reason 
why photographic images of this wedding should not be protected.”20 Accordingly, the 
images should “enjoy the same protection as more conventional trade secrets.”21 It 
would, however, be just as logical to ask whether there are any principled reasons why 
the images should be protected and treated as conventional trade secrets.  
Lord Nicholls, dissenting, took a different approach, which avoided the need 
to resolve this issue. Rather than deciding whether the photographs constituted a 
“secret”, he relied on the established scope of breach of confi dence and concluded 
that the prior publication by OK! placed the allegedly secret information in the public 
domain. The question of whether or not the information was worthy of protection as 
“confi dential” then became redundant, because “once the approved pictures were 
published, albeit simultaneously, publication of the unapproved pictures was not a 
breach of confi dence.”22  
It is on this matter that one of the most serious divergences emerges in their 
Lordships’ opinions. It was accepted by all parties that Hello! and OK! published their 
wedding editions almost simultaneously on 24 November 2000.Yet while Lord Nicholls 
held that this publication by OK! destroyed its claim to confi dentiality, the majority 
decided that Hello!’s actions still constituted a breach of confi dence.23 Baroness Hale, 
who acknowledged that the photographs “were undoubtedly a secret unless and until 
OK! chose to publish the images authorised by the Douglases”,24 did not comment 
on the fact that the images had been published by OK!. Lord Brown addressed this 
question in order to justify his decision in favour of OK! and stated that:25  
The secret consists no less of each and every visual image of the wedding than of the wedding 
as a whole. Assume, for example, that OK! had chosen to publish photographs of the bride 
and groom in one issue, the guests in the next, and the presents later still. The confi dence 
would, I think, continue throughout and I see no reason why at some point bootlegged photo-
graphs should suddenly become acceptable on the grounds that the look of the wedding was 
now in the public domain so that no confi dentiality in its photographic image remained to 
be protected.
But, applying this test, at what point, if at all, would bootlegged photographs 
become acceptable? Again, no answer is given.  
19 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. 
20 Para 307.
21 Para 310.
22 Para 257.
23 As an aside, if the majority had concurred with Lord Nicholls, this would mean that OK! had destroyed 
its own case: evidence in the earlier hearings indicated that OK! rushed forward publication of the 
authorised photographs to beat or meet Hello! on the newsstands. If OK! had stuck to its original time-
scale for publication and allowed Hello! to publish a day before, Lord Nicholls would presumably have 
decided in OK!’s favour, on the grounds that the confi dential information was not in the public domain 
when Hello! published its unauthorised photographs. 
24 Para 307.
25 Para 329.
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Lord Hoffmann offers the most detailed and arguably the most logical solution, by 
treating the authorised images and the paparazzo pictures as two different pieces of 
information. In his analysis, OK!’s publication of certain authorised images meant that 
those images were in the public domain26 but “no other pictures were in the public 
domain and they did not enter the public domain merely because they resembled 
other pictures which had.”27 Noting that he could not understand Lord Nicholls’ view 
that publication of approved photographs rendered publication of unapproved photo-
graphs acceptable,28 Lord Hoffmann concluded that OK! had an enforceable right 
of confi dence in the authorised photographs.29 With majority support, the award of 
£1,033,156 in favour of OK! made by Lindsay J at fi rst instance was reinstated.30     
C. CONCLUSION
This brief summary of the breach of confi dence issues in Douglas v Hello! has 
attempted to highlight some of the uncertainties that remain. The two key issues are 
(i) the factors that determine whether information is confi dential information worthy 
of protection and (ii) where that information comprises a number of related images 
(as in the present case), whether publication of some of those images destroys the 
confi dence in other images, whether authorised or not.  
Although some may share Lord Walker’s concern that “it is not obvious why a 
claimant should be able to invoke the law’s protection for the confi dentiality of his 
or her private life (this claim being based on the high principle of respect for human 
autonomy and dignity) and also to invoke its protection for the commercial confi -
dentiality of the same or similar material, as a trade secret, until it is to be disclosed 
for profi t at a time of his or her own choosing”,31 it remains the case that celebrity 
information is a valuable commodity. This decision refl ects commercial practice and 
reaches a practical conclusion, although their Lordships were careful to stress that the 
decision does not establish an “image right” or “any unorthodox form of intellectual 
property.”32  
When taken with the Court of Appeal’s decision in favour of the Douglases, this 
decision would appear to mean that, where individuals control information regarding 
themselves (whether details of their personal lives or photographic images of a partic-
26 Any unauthorised reproduction of the approved images would thereafter be a breach of copyright rather 
than breach of confi dence.
27 Para 122.
28 Para 121.
29 It is clear, however, that Lord Hoffmann was content to apply the recognised principles of breach of 
confi dence in reaching this decision. For example, he considered two of the other elements of the action 
and acknowledged (at para 120) that, even if OK! had an enforceable right, it would not be breached if 
the information used by Hello! was obtained otherwise than in breach of confi dence or if publication of 
the information was in the public interest.
30 [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), [2003] 3 All ER 996 (on liability); [2003] EWHC 2629 (Ch) (on quantum). 
Damages were assessed at £1,026,706 for OK!’s loss of profi t and a further award of £6,450 was made 
for wasted costs.
31 Para 275.
32 Para 124 per Lord Hoffmann. See also Baroness Hale at para 307 and compare with Lord Walker’s 
concerns at paras 285 and 297.
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ular event), then they can protect it by way of privacy, and can also exploit it commer-
cially by passing rights to the information to other parties – rights which can be enforced 
through the doctrine of breach of confi dence. In the words of Lord Hoffmann: 33  
Some may view with distaste a world in which information about the events of a wedding… 
should be sold in the market in the same way as information about how to make a better 
mousetrap. But being a celebrity or publishing a celebrity magazine are lawful trades and I 
see no reason why they should be outlawed from such protection as the law of confi dence 
may offer.
Gillian Black
University of Edinburgh
  
The Rights of Relatives to Damages 
(Mesothelioma) (Scotland) Act 2007
The incidence of mesothelioma, a cancer once regarded as rare, is now sometimes 
described as having attained the stage of an epidemic.1 When the UK mesothelioma 
register was established in 1968, 153 deaths were recorded for that year: in 2005, 
a peak of “around 1950-2450 deaths per year some time between 2011 and 2015” 
was estimated.2 The most recent fi gures available now show that annual mortality has 
already entered that range, with 1969 deaths recorded in 2003.3
Two distinctive features of mesothelioma have necessitated special legal responses. 
The fi rst is that the disease has a long latency period, averaging more than 40 years 
from asbestos exposure to diagnosis.4 Recent research across a range of countries has 
indicated that asbestos consumption from 1960 to 1969 was signifi cantly associated 
with mesothelioma deaths occurring from 2000 to 2004.5 In contrast to this lengthy 
latency period, however, survival times for mesothelioma are short, with most deaths 
occurring within fourteen months of diagnosis.6
33 Para 124. 
1 C Pelucchi et al, “The mesothelioma epidemic in Western Europe: an update” (2004) 90 British Journal 
of Cancer 1022.
2 J T Hodgson et al, “The expected burden of mesothelioma mortality in Great Britain from 2002 to 2050” 
(2005) 92 British Journal of Cancer 587 at 591.
3 Health and Safety Executive, Mesothelioma (available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/causdis/meso.
htm).
4 C Bianchi et al, “Latency periods in asbestos-related mesothelioma of the pleura” (1997) 6 European 
Journal of Cancer Prevention 162.
5 R-T Lin et al, “Ecological association between asbestos-related diseases and historical asbestos consump-
tion: an international analysis” (2007) 369 Lancet 844.
6 This is the fi gure provided by the Scottish Executive (Scottish Executive, Amendment to Section 1(2) 
of the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976: Consultation Paper (2006) para 1.1). No source is given for this 
fi gure, but it is consistent with the medical literature: see, e.g. J Peto et al, “Continuing increase in 
mesothelioma mortality in Britain” (1995) 345 Lancet 535. 
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